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LABOR ARBITRATION OF GRIEVANCES
INVOLVING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
Wmurm B. Goumi t
By enacting title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 Congress
acknowledged the fact that a substantial number of unions and employers were dealing unfairly with minority group workers. Hearings
conducted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy highlighted the failure of
many who do business with the Government to comply with prohibitions
of racial discrimination theoretically imposed upon them through
government contracts.' A greater awareness of this problem has triggered administrative as well as judicial articulation of the doctrine that
unions certified to represent workers within an appropriate unit owe a
duty to represent such employees in a fair and just manner.' Thus it
is a lame defense to a charge of racial discrimination to contend that
collective bargaining is a private affair which need only reflect the
4
interests of the parties to the agreement: management and the union.
The rights of minority workers can be strongly influenced by the results
of collective bargaining. In particular, the arbitration clauses included
in most collective bargaining agreements can have substantial impact
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This article seeks to develop further the basic analysis presented in a paper read
at the American Bar Association Institute of Equal Employment Opportunity Law in
Washington, D.C. on March 29, 1969, reprinted in Gould, Non-Governmental Remedies
for Employment Discrimination, 20 SYRAcUSE L. REv. 865 (1969). Although the
article equates Negro workers with minorities, it is of course clear that other
groups fit into this category and that some of the same assumptions can be applied
to them.
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142 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to e-15 (1964).
2 N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1969, at 46, col. 2.
3 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S.
335, 342 (1964); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46 (1957); Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337-38 (1953) ; Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232, 238-40 (1949) ; Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen,
323 U.S. 210 (1944); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1944);
Local 12, Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F2d 12, 16-17 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 837 (1967); Metal Workers Local 1, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964); Miranda
Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 184-85 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F2d 172 (2d
Cir. 1963).
4Unions and employers violate the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-158, 159-168 (1964), when they attempt to bargain to the point of impasse
over an illegal demand, such as a racially discriminatory demand prohibited by title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-1 to e-15 (1964) ; see NLRB
v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). It is possible that § 1
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964), prohibits racial discrimination in employment as well as housing; see Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409, 441 n.78 (1968). See also Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65).
(40)
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upon the rights of black workers who allege both racial discrimination
and contract violation-rights which these legislative and doctrinal
developments seek to protect.
However, considering the important role played by labor arbitration in the collective bargaining process, 5 it is surprising that arbitration's potential for dealing with racial discrimination has to date received so little attention.' In fact, commentary on the law evolving
both from administrative agencies and the courts has thus far obscured
the role of arbitration.7 Instead, the focus of discussion has been on
public law (such as the National Labor Relations Act," with its duty of
fair representation doctrine, and title VII 9) as a vehicle to deal with
racial discrimination in employment.
One may argue that this is as it should be, since collective bargaining and arbitration are private processes essentially tailored to the
needs of the parties. However, this viewpoint suggests that there is a
sharp demarcation between public and private labor law, and that the
obligations which have their origin in the former are not to be incorporated into the arbitral process. Supporters of this dichotomy also
emphasize the availability of recently devised public law sanctions intended to help minority group workers, which should make reliance
upon arbitrators unnecessary. This Article maintains there is no such
sharp distinction, and even if there were, the obligation of fair representation for minority groups, developed in public law, should be enforced in private agreements by arbitrators.
5 "[A]rbitration of labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements is part
and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself." United Steelworkers v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
I See Gould, Non-Governmental Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 20
SYRAcusE L. REv. 865 (1969) ; cf. Platt, The Relationship Between Arbitration and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 3 GA. L. REv. 398, 403-06 (1969). See
generally Wallen, Industrial Relations Problems of Employing the Disadvantaged,
Paper delivered for 22d Annual Meeting of National Academy of Arbitrators, Jan.
31, 1969. However, the general problem of arbitration and public law has been treated
in Howlett, The Arbitrator, the NLRB and the Courts, in PRoCrgn-NGS OF THE
TWENT
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARITRATORS 67
(1967) ; Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law and.Labor Arbitration, in PRO-

CEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH: ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ABITRATORS 1 (1967); and Blumrosen, Public Policy Considerations in Labor

Arbitration Cases, 14 RUTGERs L. REv. 217 (1960).
7
See generally Aaron, The Union's Duty of Fair Representation Under the
Railway Labor and National Labor Relations Acts, 34 J. Am L. & Com. 167 (1968) ;
Aaron, So..e Aspects of the Union's Duty of FairRepresentation,22 OHIO ST. L.J. 39,
49-54 (1961) ; Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VIL. L. REv. 151, 161-63
(1957); Gould, Seniority and the Black Worker: Reflections on Quarles and Its
Implications, 47 TEXAS L. REv. 1039 (1969) ; Gould, The Negro Revolution and the
Law of Collective Bargaining, 34 FoRDHAm L. REV. 207 (1965) ; Sovern, The National
Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination,62 CoLum. L. REv. 563 (1962). See
also M. SovEmE, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
(1966).
829 U.S.C. §§ 151-58, 159-67 (1964).
042 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to e-15 (1964).
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The principal attraction of the neat dichotomy outlined above--and
its corollary treatment of arbitration as the parties' own preserve-is
the resulting control which unions and employers can exercise over
grievance-arbitration machinery. This principle of strong unionemployer control finds strong support both from Congress and the
Supreme Court. Congress has stated explicitly that "[f] inal adjustment
by a method agreed upon by the parties is . .

.

the desirable method

for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or
interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement." '0 The
Court has vigorously enforced this policy. In Republic Steel Corp.
v. Maddox," Mr. Justice Harlan concluded for a majority of the Court
that the individual worker must exhaust grievance-arbitration machinery for the redress of contract grievances before proceeding into
court. He stated that if workers could "side-step" the collective agreement and file suits in court, the uniformity and orderliness of an "exclusive method" would be undermined.' - Then, in Vaca v. Sipes, 3 the
Supreme Court severely limited the role of the individual worker in
cases challenging a union's decision not to process a grievance. Warning against the possibility that the parties might cease negotiating
"detailed grievance and arbitration procedures" in accordance with
national labor policy if the grievant could unilaterally proceed to arbitration, the Court said, "we conclude that a union does not breach its
duty of fair representation, and thereby open up a suit by the employee,
.. merely because it settled the grievance short of arbitration." '4
Thus the Court not only reaffirmed the Maddox exhaustion requirements, but also concluded that an individual worker has no right to
proceed to arbitration. The vice was further tightened when the Court
later in the case addressed itself to an individual worker's right to sue
in court subsequent to processing his grievance through the machinery:
[W]e think the wrongfully discharged employee may bring
an action against his employer in the face of a defense based
upon the failure to exhaust contractual remedies, provided the
employee can prove that the union as bargaining agent
breached its duty of fair representationin its handling of the
employee's grievance...
10 Labor-Management Relations Act § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1964) [hereinafter cited as Taft-Hartley Act] ; see United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960) ; United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564, 566 (1960); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,
455-56 (1957).

"1379 U.S. 650 (1965).
121d. at 653.
13 386 U.S. 171 (1967).

14 386 U.S. at 192.
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[I] t is obvious that the courts will be compelled to pass upon
whether there has been a breach of the duty of fair representation in the context of many § 301 breach-of-contract
actions. If a breach of duty by the union and a breach of
contract by the employer are proven, the court must fashion
an appropriate remedy. 5
With a heavy and repressive hand Vaca imposes upon the worker
the burden of proving that the union has breached its duty of fair
representation " before the matter may be pursued in court. However,
the logic involved is noteworthy. So intertwined are the public and
private law considerations in labor grievances that Vaca will not
permit a plaintiff to recover on a privately negotiated contract without
first showing violation of a statutory duty. A major theme of this
Article is that title VII, and the legislative motives and assumptions
behind its enactment, should expand the rights of minority group
workers before arbitrators as well as the courts. Any objection to this
expansion based on the asserted dichotomy of public and private law
is compromised by the logic of Vaca. The demarcation line between
these public and private functions becomes increasingly artificial.

I.

THE SHORTCOMINGS OF ARBITRATION

A. The Glover Case
Neither Maddox nor Vaca involved racial discrimination. However, in Glover v. St. Louis-San FranciscoRailway Co.,"' the Court, in
one of its first cases involving both duty of fair representation and
contract interpretation,'" indicated that there are some limits to the
Maddox-Vaca guidelines.
In Glover, thirteen workers-eight Negroes and five whitesbrought against the union and the company an action alleging that both
parties discriminatorily refused to promote Negro workers to the classification of carman. Because their promotional opportunities were also
impaired by the alleged practices, white workers joined in the suit.
Subsequent to the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust
the grievance machinery available in the labor contract, in the union's
constitution, and before the National Railroad Adjustment Board,
plaintiffs amended their complaint to say that Negro workers had
"called upon" the union to process grievances, but that no action had
1' Id. at 186-87 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
11Cases cited note 3 supra & accompanying text.
17 393 U.S. 324 (1969).
18 For earlier cases concerning the issues of both fair representation and contract
interpretation, see Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964) ; Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41 (1957).
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been taken. Moreover, it was alleged that "other representatives" of
the union had told the Negro plaintiffs, "(a) that they were kidding
themselves if they thought they could ever get white men's jobs;
(b) that nothing would ever be done for them; and (c) that to file a
formal complaint with the Brotherhood or with the Company would be
a waste of their time." "9 In the amended complaint, similar responses
were alleged to have been made by both the union and the company.
One might think that both Maddox and Vaca would be persuasive
authority for resort to contractual procedures. However, Vaca, in
further explaining the Maddox exhaustion rules, indicated that there
would be some exceptions to its general rule.
[I]t is settled that the employee must at least attempt to
exhaust exclusive grievance and arbitration procedures established by the bargaining agreement. Republic Steel Corp. v.
Maddox. However, because these contractual remedies have
been devised and are often controlled by the union and the
employer, they may well prove unsatisfactory or unworkable
for the individual grievant. The problem then is to determine
under what circumstances the individual employee may obtain
judicial review of his breach-of-contract claim despite his
failure to secure relief through the contractual remedial
procedures.
An obvious situation in which the employee should not be
limited to the exclusive remedial procedures established by the
contract occurs when the conduct of the employer amounts to
a repudiation of those contractual procedures. Cf. Drake
Bakeries v. Bakery Workers . ...

In such a situation (and

there may of course be others), the employer is estopped by
his own conduct to rely on the unexhausted grievance and
arbitration procedures as a defense to the employee's cause
of action.
We think that another situation when the employee may
seek judicial enforcement of his contractual rights arises if,
as is true here, the union has sole power under the contract
to invoke the higher stages of the grievance procedure, and if,
as is alleged here, the employee-plaintiff has been prevented
from exhausting his contractual remedies by the union's
wrongful refusal to process the grievance. It is true that the
employer in such a situation may have done nothing to prevent
exhaustion of the exclusive contractual remedies to which he
agreed in the collective bargaining agreement. But the
employer has committed a wrongful discharge in breach of
that agreement [in a Vaca-type case], a breach which could
be remedied through the grievance process to the employee'9

393 U.S. at 326-27.
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plaintiff's benefit were it not for the union's breach of its
statutory duty of fair representation to the employee. To
leave the employee remediless in such
circumstances would, in
20
our opinion, be a great injustice.

Thus, the Glover court reasoned that it would be a futile act to
pursue contract remedies controlled by those very individuals from
whose discriminatory actions the plaintiffs seek relief. But Mr. Justice
Black's opinion for the Court is not entirely dependent upon the fact
that the union and employer, "acting in concert," control the adjudicative machinery. That rationale, perhaps implicit in the title VII cases
rejecting the exhaustion doctrine,"- would exempt a good portion of all
racial discrimination cases from Maddox and Vaca, especially where
both unions and employers are necessarily implicated, such as in
seniority and promotion matters.
Such a wide interpretation of the Glover rationale, however, is
forestalled by the heavy emphasis on the union hostility alleged in the
amended complaint. As the Court said: "[T]he attempt to exhaust
contractual remedies, required under Maddox, is easily satisfied by petitioners' repeated complaints to company and union officials, and no
time-consuming formalities should be demanded of them." 2 Although
eager plaintiffs may be willing to make liberal use of allegations such
as those used in Glover, the hostility rationale would not permit blanket
application of the Glover result to all racial discrimination cases-even
to all those involving seniority disputes.
20 386 U.S. at 184-86 (citations omitted).
21 Cf. King v. Georgia Power Co., 295 F. Supp. 943, 949 (N.D. Ga. 1968) ; Reese
v. Atlantic Steel Co., 282 F. Supp. 905, 906 (N.D. Ga. 1967); Dent v. St. LouisS.F. Ry., 265 F. Supp. 56, 57-58 (N.D. Ala. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 406 F2d
339 (5th Cir. 1969). However, in these cases, the plaintiffs did not allege that the
racial discrimination was itself a violation of the labor contract. Where that allegation
has been made, Glover has not been applied in the absence of a showing that resort
to contractual procedures would be futile. See Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of
International Harvester Co., 71 L.R.R.M. 2886 (N.D. Ill. 1969); cf. NLRB v. Union
of Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 425-28 (1968) ; Brady v. TWA, 401 F.2d 87 (3d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969).
Glover also involves the question whether administrative remedies available under
the Railway Labor Act deprive a federal district court of jurisdiction. Proceeding
upon the assumption that Congress provided for a "new and enlarged basis for
elimination of racial and other discriminations in employment" the Eighth Circuit
held that a federal district court is not deprived of jurisdiction in a dispute involving
racial discrimination and "assignment, classification, terms and conditions of employment. These are statutory rights, not contractual rights embodied in collective
bargaining agreements." Norman v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 71 L.R.R.M. 2940, 2948
(8th Cir. 1969) ; see Dent v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Co., supra, at 57-58 Previously,
in duty of fair representation cases courts dismissed complaints involving racial discrimination where the subject matter was within the jurisdiction of the Railway Labor
Act. E.g., Howard v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Co., 361 F2d 905 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 986 (1966). See, however, the views of Mr. Justice Black in Brotherhood
of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768, 774 (1952) ; cf. Foy v. Norfolk & West.
Ry., 377 F2d 243 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 848 (1967).
22393 U.S. at 331 (emphasis added).
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B. Institutional Deficiencies of Arbitration of Racial
Discrimination Grievances
The Supreme Court would have been justified in painting arbitration of racial discrimination cases with a broader brush than was
used in Glover. Racial discrimination is one of the "circumstances"
where, in the language of Vaca, control of the process by the union and
employer makes the process "unsatisfactory or unworkable" for the
employee, and where another forum should hear the case, unhampered
by the severe limitations which Vaca imposes upon judicial review.
First, it is obvious that the aggrieved worker or group cannot
expect to obtain an objective evaluation of the issue in dispute if the
parties who are alleged to have discriminated have control of the
grievance machinery. Nor is the situation substantially altered if the
grievance is processed to an "impartial" arbitrator rather than a unionemployer committee. 3 In a union in which the leadership is not representative of minority workers, the arbitrator is in effect chosen by the
discriminators and not by the discriminatee. While there are few
dishonest or corrupt arbitrators, it is nevertheless difficult to ignore the
pressures at work. One cannot envisage much of a chance for the
Negro grievant, whom the parties often regard as disruptive and unstable, when the arbitrator owes his position to the union and the
employer.
Second, black workers are almost totally absent from positions of
leadership in organized labor, even in unions where their numbers
are high. 4 Thus, one cannot yet assume that minority group
2 3
The NLRB in Denver-Chicago Trucking Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 1416 (1961), ruled
that "the procedures adopted [for union-employer grievance committees must] meet

normal standards as to sufficiency, fairness, and regularity" and that there must not be

"evidence of irregularity, collusion, or inadequate provisions for the taking of testimony." Id. at 1421. Where these conditions have been met, the Board has sustained
the committees' decisions. But wherever there is evidence of unfair practices resulting
in a discharge, the Board has reinstated discharged employees. Compare Eazor Express, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. No. 201, 69 L.R.R.M. 1081 (1968); Mitchell Transp., Inc.,
152 N.L.R.B. 122, 123, 130-31 (1965) ; Northside Elec. Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 34, 35 n.1
(1965); Modern Motor Express, Inc,, 149 N.L.R.B. 1507, 1510-12 (1964); Roadway
Express, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 513, 514 (1963) ; Teamsters Local 414, 142 N.L.R.B. 273,
282-283 (1963) with Hoisting Eng'rs Local 701, 152 N.L.R.B. 49 (1965) (discharged
employee need not resort to grievance machinery because grievance committee was
composed of those who had discriminated); Precision Fittings, Inc., 141 N.L.R.B.
1034, 1041 (1963) and Gateway Transp. Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1763 (1962) (a 48-hour
notice of hearing, refusal of union's counsel to represent its member, and denial of
employee's request for a continuance made procedure unfair). In DC Int'l, Inc., 162
N.L.R.B. 1383 (1967), although the trial examiner found that the procedures of the
arbitration committee were regular, the committee had not heard evidence on the crucial
issue of pretextual discharge. The Board considered this issue, found it to be an unfair
labor practice, and set aside the decision of the arbitration committee.
24
See Steelworkers Debate Black Representation, 91 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 16-17.
However, most recently, a new union with black leadership has been formed
called the National Council of Wholesale, Retail, Office and Processing Workers of
America, to be aligned with the Alliance for Labor Action composed of the UAW
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grievances will be dealt with more sensitively, because their representatives have been integrated into positions of some responsibility.
Although encouraging, partial integration in the lower ranks of union
leadership has yet to establish real representation in decision-making.
Indeed, lack of Negro leadership in the unions evidences in part the
racial discrimination in American employment which prompted Congress to pass title VII in 1964.
Third, although the facts in Glover may be to the contrary, quite
often the collective bargaining agreement does not support legitimate
grievances asserted by protesting black workers. The cause of action
is far more often founded in public law concepts, such as the duty of
fair representation or title VII. This pattern of conflict between public
law and contract makes incomprehensible the National Labor Relations
Board's holding in Local 12, Rubber Workers 2 that the union must
carry protests against an allegedly discriminatory seniority system to
arbitration. 6 Moreover, the seniority agreement itself may incorporate
discriminatory practices. While Mr. Justice Fortas in his concurring
opinion in Vaca indicated that an order compelling arbitration was
"[p] recisely and uniquely the kind of order which is within the province
of the Board," 27 it would appear from the words of the statute to be a
function of the judiciary operating under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley
Act.28 The problem is that Negro workers are delivered up to the very
contract against which they have complained. Until the arbitration
process is revised, one cannot expect the holding in Rubber Workers to
contribute to their job advancement.
Even where there is a no-discrimination clause prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race-and even where the clause has been
negotiated subsequent to the passage of civil rights legislation-arbitrators are generally reluctant to rely upon public law concepts in their
opinions and awards. The primary reason for this attitude is the wellaccepted notion that the arbitrator is a creature of the parties and
is commissioned to interpret their wishes. Therefore, he is not to
impose the public policies of society upon them. Moreover, unlike the
judiciary, which has the authority to set aside awards which conflict
and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters.

"The top office, either chairman

or president, is expected to go to a Negro; Cleveland Robinson, secretary-treasurer of
District 65, [formerly a part of the AFL-CIO Retail-Wholesale Union] is a likely
choice." Wall Street Journal, May 23, 1969, at 4, col. 2-3.
25150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1954), enforced, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
389 U.S.
837 (1967).
26
See id.; cf. Local 485, Elec. Workers, 170 N.L.R.B. No. 121, 67 L.R.R.M. 1609
(1968); Port Drum Co., 170 N.L.R.B. No. 51, 67 L.R.R.M. 1506 (1968); Gould,
The Negro Revolution and the Law of Collective Bargaining, 34 FORDHAm L. REv.
207, 226-30 (1965).
27386 U.S. at 201.

2829 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
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with law, the arbitrator does not necessarily have special training
in law-let alone an expertise in the fast moving complexities of labor
and civil rights law. As the Supreme Court instructed in United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,"0
He [the arbitrator] may of course look for guidance from
many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it
draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.
When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this
obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement
of the award."'
What is the role of the arbitrator who is appointed to interpret a
clause which may have a discriminatory impact? May the arbitrator
rely upon the no-discrimination clause or a separability clause (which
assumes that the unlawful clauses in the contract are to be separated out
by someone, in order that the relationship between the parties remain
sound and intact) to overrule, for instance, discriminatory seniority
clauses? Arbitrators have not been hesitant to fashion the remedy
of injunction and damages for the no-strike clause, 2 or back pay for
a discharge without just cause " despite the absence of specific authority
in the collective bargaining agreement. However, the acceptability of
29
See Monroe Sander Corp. v. Livingston, 377 F2d 6, 13 (2d Cir. 1967) (dictum) ;
McGuire v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 355 F.2d 352, 358 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 988 (1966); Glendale Mfg. Co. v. Local 520, ILGWU, 283 F.2d 936, 938-39
(4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961) ; Local 985, UAW v. W. M. Chace
Co., 262 F. Supp. 114, 117-19 (E.D. Mich. 1966). For a discussion of the conflict
between arbitration and public policies, see Local 453, Elec. Workers v. Otis Elevator
Co., 206 F. Supp. 853 (S.D.N.Y.) & 201 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Black v.
Cutter Laboratories, 43 Cal. 2d 788, 278 P.2d 905 (1955), appeal dismissed, 351 U.S.
292 (1956). See generally Blumrosen, Public Policy Considerationsin Labor Arbitration Cases, 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 217 (1960); Dunau, Three Problems in Labor Arbitration, 55 VA. L. REV. 427, 439-47 (1969); Sovern, Section 301 and the Primary
Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76 HARv. L. Rxv. 529 (1963).
30 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
S1 Id. at 597.
32
See New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. Local 1418, Longshore Workers, 389 F2d 369,
370 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828 (1968); Tanker Serv. Comm., Inc. v. International Organization of Masters, 269 F. Supp. 551 (E.D. Pa. 1967); Ruppert v.
Egelhofer, 3 N.Y.2d 576, 580-81, 148 N.E.2d 129, 130 (1958); Ford Motor Co., 41
Lab. Arb. 619 (1963) cf. Safeway Stores v. Local 111, Bakery Workers, 390 F.2d 79,
80-81 (5th Cir. 1968); Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v. Local 1291, Longshoremen,
365 F.2d 295, 296-97 (3d Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 389 U.S. 64 (1967);
Gulf & S. Am. S.S. Co. v. National Maritime Union, 360 F2d 63, 64 (5th Cir. 1966).
33 See International Harvester Co., 9 Lab. Arb. 894 (1947); cf. Consolidated
Paper Co., 33 Lab. Arb. 840 (1959); United States Indus. Chem. Co., 33 Lab. Arb.
335 (1959) ; Elberta Crate & Box Co., 32 Lab. Arb. 228 (1959) ; International Paper
Co., 31 Lab. Arb. 494 (1958) ; United States Rubber Co., 13 Lab. Arb. 839 (1949).
One of the more extraordinary arbitral remedies issued to date is Jack Meilman, 34
Lab. Arb. 771 (1960), where the arbitrator ordered a company to cease operations
at its new location, to reestablish its operation where it had formerly operated, and
to pay damages to the union for wages and other contract benefits lost by the company's breach of contract. See generally Fleming, Arbitrators and the Remedy
Power, 48 VA. L. Rzv. 1199 (1962).
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these decisions is attributable to the fact that they are in accord with the
parties' conscious and subconscious expectations. In the case of discriminatory grievances, all of the factors indicate that the parties view
minority group members as a disruptive intrusion into what might
otherwise be a smooth-working bilateral arrangement. 4 This attitude
is certainly prevalent in some seniority disputes e although in the
area of discipline and discharge one suspects that the union (and sometimes the employer) views the process of frivolous grievances as a
harmless effort which releases the union from the snares of duty of
fair representation suits. Ordinarily, however, the parties do not intend
arbitrators to function as a mini-Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Accordingly, in most instances the parties do not view the nodiscrimination clause as a grant of authority akin to the no-strike and
discharge clauses.
[I]t may be possible for arbitrators, as well as courts, to invalidate a discriminatory clause on the theory that the parties
cannot be assumed to have intended to act illegally. But
insofar as arbitrators are concerned, the violation should be
clearly unlawful and the remedy uncomplicated. If these ingredients are not present, the arbitrator will be too far in
front of the contract expectations of labor and management 3
Some arbitrators themselves maintain that the violation of law
must be very clear in order that the arbitrator's bonds be loosened, 7 although others would prefer to avoid the risk of rubber-stamping discrimination when the issue smacks of race.3 However, even with the latter
group the problems are by no means solved. Racial discrimination
34

As Judge J. Skelly Wright said in an unfair labor practice case arising under
the National Labor Relations Act:
The company did agree to a general non-discrimination clause. However,
the Examiner could reasonably have found that such a clause meant little if
the company would not also work to correct individual grievances. See Local
Union No. 12, United Rubber etc. Workers v. N.L.R.B., 5 Cir., 368 F2d 12,
14 . . . (1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 . . . (1967), where the collective
bargaining agreement provided for non-discriminatory seniority for employees
but where "[a]s a matter of custom and interpretation * * * Negro employees
with greater seniority had no rights over white employees with less
seniority * * *."
United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 70 L.R.R.M. 2489, 2493 n.10 (D.C. Cir.
1969). For a discussion of this case, see Gould, The Emerging Law Against Racial
Discrimination,64 Nw. U.L. REv. - (1969).
35 See generally Gould, Employment Security, Seniority and Race: The Role
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 How. L.J. 1 (1967) ; Gould, Seniority
and the Black Worker: Reflections on Quarles and its Implications, 47 TExAs L. Rnv.
1039 (1969).
38 Gould, Non-Governmental Remedies for Employment Discrimination, supra
note 6, at 872-73.
3
7 See, e.g., Ingraham Co., 48 Lab. Arb. 884, 889 (1966).
3
8 See Platt, The Relationship Between Arbitration and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, supra note 6, at 407-10.
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(especially the northern ghetto variety) possesses a subtle and elusive
quality with which even the most sympathetic arbitrator may not be
equipped to deal. This is a fundamental reason for the existence of
expert administrative agencies such as the National Labor Relations
Board and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Moreover, since the arbitrator is probably not trained in labor and civil rights
law, the potential for error increases. This sad fact is illustrated
dramatically by the arbitrator's award in Hotel Employers' Association."' The arbitrator there boldly stated that a statistical analysis of
minority groups by job classification is immaterial unless used to estabThis, of
lish an unlawful preference for minority group workers."
course, will come as a great surprise to agencies such as the EEOC
which rely upon and, in fact, require submission of statistics concerning
minority group participation in the work force, under a statute prohibiting preferential treatment. 4 '
Although arbitrators may blunder and stumble when the issues presented are foreign to their expertise, nevertheless it is too late to reject
this process as a means of resolving discrimination claims. Arbitration
has achieved legal respectability through the Supreme Court's endorsement of a standard which compels a resisting party to proceed to
arbitration in practically every instance that the other party desires it.4'
Furthermore, the NLRB has refused to set aside arbitration awards
dealing with unfair labor charges if the proceedings "have been fair and
regular, all parties [have] agreed to be bound, and the decision of the
[arbitrator] is not clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the
[National Labor Relations] Act." " It is anomalous that the Board
accords such deference to arbitration in light of the reception given to
public law by arbitrators. Insofar as title VII is concerned, it is
especially dangerous to leave this garden untended when one considers
the critical issues involved. Arbitration is an established part of the
collective bargaining process. It is vital to insure it is a sound one.
New approaches to the use of arbitration in grievances involving racial
discrimination are needed. For if racial discrimination cases cannot be
heard by arbitrators, the uniformity to which Vaca has given honor
and consideration will be undermined by a dual system composed of
public and private routes-the first for racial cases and the second for
nonracial. Glover, despite its virtues, has already moved us in this
39 47 Lab. Arb. 873 (1966).
40Id. at 885.
411967 EEOC ANx. REP. 21-35.
42 See cases cited note 10 supra. For varying positions on the desirability of this

rule and the arbitration process, see R. FLEmiNG, THE LABOR AaBrrmArxoN
(1965); P. HAYS, LABOR ARBITRATION: A DISSENTING VIEW (1966).
4

Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955).
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direction. The Court's opinion highlights the deficiencies of Vaca and
its overly stringent limitations upon any individual's ability to sue both
union and employer. In part, the crises of racial discrimination has
made it simply impossible to apply narrowly the rules of Vaca to this
important problem.
Moreover, arbitrators are infinitely more capable than government
officials and judges in interpreting labor contracts and fashioning remedies. As the Supreme Court said in United Steelworkers v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., "The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring
the same experience and competence to bear upon the determination of
a grievance [as an arbitrator], because he cannot be similarly
informed." 44
Finally, it is a plain fact that there is no clear avenue of redress
for the Negro worker who attempts to cope with racial discrimination
in employment today. Slow moving, understaffed, and overlapping
agencies,' coupled with Congress's failure to provide the EEOC with
cease and desist powers,4 6 have made the urban powder keg even more
explosive. If arbitration can be adapted to cope with racial discrimination, a relatively expeditious forum for the redress of grievances would
then be available.
To date, EEOC has no defined policy toward labor arbitration. 47
The balance of this Article discusses a number of issues posed by the
present system of arbitration of discrimination cases, and offers pro4363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).

45

BROOKINGS

INSTITUTE, JOBS AND CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT FOR U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS

COMMISSION (1969)

[hereinafter cited as JOBS AND CIVIL RIGHTS]. The failure of
EEOC conciliation efforts to date is set forth in Note, Discrimination in Employment and in Housing: Private Enforcement Provisions of the Civil Rights Acts of
1964 and 1968, 82 HARv. L. REV. 834 (1969).
46 See Jos AND CiVI RIGHTS, supra note 45, for a history of the legislative
proposals on this subject. The current proposal to give the EEOC cease and desist
powers was introduced by Senator Philip Hart (D. Mich.). S. REP. 2029, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). President Nixon has now proposed that the Commission's
powers be broadened. N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1969, at 1, col. 5.
47See Deferral to Arbitration, Opinion Letter of EEOC General Counsel, Oct.
20, 1966, in 6 LABOR PoLIcY AND PRAcTIcE 401:3028.
While the Commission is sympathetic to the principal of deferral to contractual grievance and arbitration machinery, the statutory time table prescribed by Title VII does not allow for such action. Section 706(d) and
(e) of the Act require that in cases where deferral to a State Fair Employment Practice Commission is not warranted, as is the case with an allegation
of discrimination based on sex in California, the charge must be filed within
90 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. .

.

. [W]e consider

that it is beyond the province of the Commission to itself derogate from the
statutory command by deferring pending charges beyond the prescribed time.
We have, however, concluded that where the charging party and the
respondents consent to have the Commission stay its proceedings by executing
waivers, the Commission may elect to honor such requests for a reasonable
period. While your letter indicates that the respondent would be interested
in executing such a waiver, we have received no indication that the charging
party would likewise be interested in a stay of the Commission's proceedings.
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posals for updating the process, while bearing in mind the difficulties
of both preserving self-reliant industrial government and, at the same
time, protecting black workers against employment discrimination.

II.

ELECTION OF REMEDIES

While Glover can be read to exempt from the clutches of Maddox
and Vaca4 8 much of what is covered by title VII, there is another problem presented by the interplay between public law and private arbitration processes. What are the public law implications of resort to the
grievance process by the individual or group? More specifically, does
the employee make an election of remedies by utilizing the grievancearbitration machinery, and thereby waive his right to a title VII remedy
issued by a court?
Courts have come to different conclusions on this matter. The
first decision-and the most severely limiting to the grievant-is Bowe
v. Colgate-PalmoliveCo. 9 In Bowe the court applied a strict election
of remedies test which prevents the individual from proceeding in court
under title VII once the grievance-arbitration process has been utilized.
The court stated:
It was and is the Court's view and conclusion that the
plaintiffs, whether named or in the class, should not and may
not have two different opportunities in two different appropriate forums for presentation and litigation of their claims.
It would be inequitable and unconscionable to subject the defendant Colgate to two series of extensive litigation, one series
in this Court and then another series under the labor
contract.50
In Washington v. Aerojet-General Corp.,"' where a reprimand and
one month's disciplinary layoff were involved, the court reached the
same result as in Bowe, but modified the procedural restrictions. In
Washington, the company and the union, with the concurrence of the
plaintiff, agreed to reduce one month's disciplinary layoff to nine days
at the third step of the grievance procedure. The court, noting that the
plaintiff had available to him two different avenues-legislative and
contractual-for the redress of his grievance, held that the plaintiff had
made a binding election of remedies. However, the court balked at
accepting the Bowe rationale wholesale:
48

Text accompanying notes 11-13 .upra.

49 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967).
o Id. at 366-67.
51282 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
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[T] he Court differs with the apparent implication of Bowe that
there must be a strict and ab initio "election of forum" made
between contractual remedies under the collective bargaining
agreement and Title VII remedies under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 prior to seeking either remedy. Because of the
time limits under the civil rights legislation, the charging party
will often be forced to initiate civil rights proceedings with
the State or Federal agency or the Federal courts at precisely
the same time that he is seeking to enforce his contractual
rights under the collective bargaining agreement.'
Holding that the plaintiff made a binding election by accepting
the company-union settlement and going back to work, the court
articulated its version of the election of remedies rule:
Initially he [the plaintiff] may pursue his remedies in both
forums but at some point a choice must be made. This point,
as in the case of concurrent jurisdiction between State and
Federal courts, is reached when a litigant has pursued his
remedies in one forum to decision, be it by settlement, the
decision of an arbitrator, or the decision of a judge. Such a
rule is not only consonant with that applied in an analogous
area, but also will contribute to the expeditious resolution of
disputes in the equal employment area and promote the sound
and equitable administration of justice by precluding an aggrieved party from subjecting a defendant to multiple actions
based upon the same claim. 3
In Edwards v. North American Rockwell Corp.,5 4 the court was
confronted with a claim for loss of straight time pay for twenty-seven
hours as a result of a suspension. Before the suit, a settlement was
made, and the plaintiff cashed a check for the amount authorized by the
parties. The court followed Washington and stated that since "the
plaintiff has pursued her contractual remedy to its conclusion, [and]
has accepted the settlement reached in that proceeding, .

.

.

[she]

must be considered to have made a binding election." 5 Thus Edwards
implicitly questions the Bowe holding that a binding election "is made
by simply initiating the grievance machinery under a collective bargaining contract." 6'
Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co.," involving an employee against
whose allegation of religious discrimination an arbitrator ruled adId. at 522.
53Id. at 523.
54291 F. Supp. 199 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
55 Id.at 209.
56 Id.at 208.
57 291 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
See also Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac.
Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219, 1225 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
6
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versely, is the most recent case. It departs substantially from the
approach taken in either Bowe, Washington, or Edwards. In Dewey,
the court noted that the arbitrator was limited to an interpretation of
the bargained agreement, and that at no time did the arbitrator address
himself to the statutory and constitutional issues involved. The court
reasoned that to preclude the plaintiff from proceeding in court under
title VII subsequent to the arbitration decision would penalize workers
for using contractual procedures, a practice favored by national labor
policy:
[T] he arbitration award should not preclude an action in this
court based upon a statute rather than the collective bargaining
agreement. To hold otherwise would be to require the employee to have come to this court without attempting a settlement through the contractual processes, as preferred by the
national labor law. Plaintiff would also have been required to
choose between two different remedies when both remedies are
provided to insure that plaintiff's contractual, statutory and
constitutional rights are protected. When rights of this type
are involved, they outweigh the interest of the companydefendant in avoiding the inconvenience and expense of multiple actions."5
The Bowe doctrine, on the other hand, is almost Draconian. For
as Washington points out, time limits for filing a charge under title VII
and state fair employment legislation make it difficult for the laintiff
to choose in any really informed manner the forum in which to proceed.
Therefore, both Washington and Edwards correctly state that merely
filing a grievance should not operate as a binding election of remedies
that would preclude title VII litigation. It is possible, for instance, that
a plaintiff-grievant will not have a proper appreciation of which forum
is more appropriate until the management or the union representative
responds to the grievance. The same is true of the EEOC's investigations and conciliation procedures.5 9 Although not discussed in
Washington or Edwards, an additional factor is the enormous pressure
that Vaca gives the union to bring to bear upon individual employees
to obtain their concurrence. Suppose that the grievance might not be
58 Id. at 789. The Board has plenary, although not exclusive, authority to remedy
unfair labor practices. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 268 (1964) ;
Smith v. Evening News Ass'n., 371 U.S. 195, 197-98 (1962). The Civil Rights Act
of 1964, fit. VII, § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1964), which provides a district
court with authority to act in the public interest, is analogous to § 10 of the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1964); cf. Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400
F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968) ; United Steelworkers v. American Int'l Aluminum Corp., 334
F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 991 (1965); Hall v. Werthan Bag
Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Tenn. 1966) ; Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees
v. Trailways of New England Inc., 232 F. Supp. 608 (D. Mass. 1964), aff'd, 343 F.2d
815 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
69 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(a), 8 (1964).
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processed past the second or third step of the procedure. What is to
become of the plaintiff whose grievance is not taken to arbitration but
is instead left unsettled? Presumably, Bowe would bind the unlucky
worker for making the wrong election. Suppose also, that a union
purports to take an objective position between the respective seniority
claims of black and white workers and then blacks become convinced,
after the second or third step, that the union has begun to undermine
their position. The union then, courtesy of Vaca, and without the consent of the Negro workers, proceeds to arbitration. Does Bowe impose
the election of remedies here? After all, the black workers may have
initiated the grievance procedure at its incipient stages. However,
under Vaca it is the union which exercises discretion in deciding which
cases should go to arbitration, regardless of whether the affected group
initiated the grievance.
Presumably, all parties involved may consent to waive the statutory
time limitations set out in title VII while the grievance is processed."0
However, it is unlikely that the party charged with discrimination
would be willing to sign such a waiver since its interests are opposed
to exposing itself to liability more than once. Indeed, the limited
judicial review established by Vaca to encourage parties to use the
grievance arbitration machinery has equal applicability, as a practical
matter, to title VII. Obviously, parties would be reluctant to enter
into settlements or proceed to arbitration when the result is ignored or
used as a plateau for a better deal in a subsequent proceeding.
While one can sympathize with the position of unions and employers who wish to negotiate a final settlement, it is important to
understand that arbitration is the quid pro quo for the strike and is
not, as we have seen, the most suitable process for the consideration of
racial discrimination grievances. One must assume that Congress
passed title VII in part because the grievance-arbitration machinery was
not an adequate forum for redress. Both Glover and the line of cases
making exhaustion requirements inapplicable to title VII 0 are consistent with this view of Congressional motivation.
60 See Deferral to Arbitration, Opinion Letter of EEOC General Counsel, supra

note 47.
01 See note 21 supra. The diversity of arbitral reactions to discrimination problems buttresses this assumption; cf. Wierton Steel Co., 50 Lab. Arb. 795 (1968);
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 49 Lab. Arb. 1186 (1967); Pitman-Moore Div., 49
Lab. Arb. 709 (1967); McCall Corp., 49 Lab. Arb. 183 (1967); Studebaker Corp.,
49 Lab. Arb. 105 (1967); The Ingraham Co., 48 Lab. Arb. 884 (1966). In the
racial area see Pangborn Corp., 48 Lab. Arb. 629 (1967) ; Tri-City Container Corp.,

42 Lab. Arb. 1044 (1964) ; Armco Steel Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. 683 (1964) ; Pittsburgh
Metallurgical Co., 38 Lab. Arb. 192 (1962); American Sugar Co., 38 Lab. Arb. 132
(1961); cf. American Standard, Inc., 52 Lab. Arb. 736 (1969); Sligo, Inc., 50 Lab.

Arb. 1203 (1968).
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The Dewey opinion provides an appealing approach to the election
of remedies question. However, there are several objections to be met
before it can be applied to racial discrimination grievances. The first,
and probably least troublesome, is that Dewey dealt with religious and
not racial discrimination. The Dewey court emphasized the fundamental role that freedom of religion plays in our constitutional heritage.
However, it certainly cannot be said that racial discrimination is any
less vital.'
Even a fleeting glance at the thirteenth, fourteenth, and
fifteenth amendments indicates that the elimination of racial discrimination is a fundamental policy of our country. In cases involving
either of these basic principles of our law, a waiver should not easily
be inferred.
Additionally, the arbitrator in Dewey specifically limited himself
to contract considerations; as a result, the court quite properly feared
that insufficient attention was given to both the title VII and constitutional claims. Thus one could argue against wide application of
Dewey that the case should not apply to situations in which an arbitrator has given thorough consideration to title VII and constitutional
claims. While consideration of such public law concepts is highly
desirable (as the first section of this Article urges) wide adoption of the
practice would maximize application of the election of remedies doctrine.
It is not a sufficient answer to the problems of racial discrimination in
employment for arbitrators merely to consider public law concepts
without adopting other reforms. It is also essential to minimize the
effect of the election of remedies doctrine, especially if the deficiencies
in the arbitration process, which are referred to below, remain unremedied. To some extent the arbitrator's approach in Dewey is dictated by the "fidelity to the contract" doctrine of Enterprise.' But the
strict interpretation of Entreprise, combined with the "ab initio" rule
of Bowe, will result in (1) lack of uniformity in title VII adjudications,
with arbitration decisions (unreviewable by judges) and courts producing substantially different results, and (2) the imposition of a penalty
upon the worker for using the grievance procedure. A doctrine which
discourages a minority group from using arbitration is at odds with the
national labor policy encouraging that process.
Another problem is that, as the Dewey opinion was careful to note,
the case involved arbitration and not a grievance settlement entered into
with the alleged discriminatee's concurrence (such as in Washington).
Thus one could argue that Dewey should be limited to cases in which
the discriminatee has not personally indicated satisfaction with a reso62 See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
63See text accompanying note 31 supra.
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lution of his case. However, this distinction is not clear-cut; to the
extent that the complainant in Dewey initiated the grievance and participated in the proceeding, a certain measure of concurrence can be
inferred. Nevertheless, both Washington and Edwards are distinguishable from Dewey in that the plaintiff in those cases actually accepted
settlement of the claim. Moreover, a concrete benefit accrued to the
party charging discrimination. Certainly, the argument for election
of remedies is stronger than in Dewey. However, when it comes to
public rights such as those contained in title VII's prohibition of racial
discrimination, the objectives of the statute must outweigh the inconvenience done to defendants through a multiplicity of suits. While the
national labor policy encouraging arbitration may properly incorporate
an election of remedies theory, public policy against racial discrimination
outweighs it. There is good reason to believe that the Board's policy
toward arbitration awards as a general rule amounts to excessive genuflection to arbitrators." At the very least, the same policy, let alone a
more rigid election of remedies doctrine, ought not to apply in the case
of racial discrimination grievances.
Nevertheless, the arbitration award ought not to be disregarded
altogether. Courts should evaluate both arbitration awards and settlements in assessing questions of violations and relief. Without creating
any kind of presumption against the plaintiff in court, the judiciary
should consider arbitration awards as evidence.' 5 One of the problems
with a rigid election doctrine is that individuals or groups may not
have the advice and assistance of friendly unions or civil rights groups.
This should be a consideration in the evaluation of an arbitral award.
Dewey, for example, properly considered the fact that the grievant was
without counsel in the arbitration proceeding.
Moreover, an award
may give the grievant less than that to which he is entitled under title
VII. Legislation to eliminate racial discrimination was necessary,
because, as a general proposition, power and sophistication are arrayed
against the discriminatee. Courts should view with alarm any procedure which would aggravate this problem.
4
See International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962), enforced sub noin.
Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir. 1964); cf. Cloverleaf Div. Adams Dairy
Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1410, 1415-16 (1964); Raley's Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. 256, 258-59
(1963); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1081 (1955). But see A. 0. Smith
Corp., 174 N.L.R.B. No. 41, 70 L.R.R.M. 1145, 1147 (1969); Horn & Hardart Co.,
173 N.L.R.B. No. 164, 69 L.R.R.M. 1522 (1968).
05 "[A]s a general proposition, the court doubts that the courts should defer in
their consideration of Title VII cases to arbitration awards. [See cases cited note
54 mupra.] At the same time, however, the court cannot agree that an arbitration
award must be dismissed out of hand as irrelevant and believes that it may properly
be considered as an item of evidence, .... ." United States v. H. K. Porter Co.,
296 F. Supp. 40, 109-10 (N.D. Ala. 1968) (footnote omitted).
06 291 F. Supp. at 789.
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The consideration of eliminating racial discrimination in the
grievance procedure must also be relied upon in dealing with the most
difficult cases-those in which the discriminatee settles and states as a
condition of settlement that the right to file a charge and sue in court
under title VII is waived. Here the election is explicit and very clear.
The question is whether it should be honored in a court. These cases
are more troublesome than a contract which prohibits a union from
filing an unfair labor practice charge,17 or which gives the union exclusive control of all employee claims." For here, the individual signs
the waiver himself and does not proceed through an agent who may
not be acting in his principal's best interests. Here again, it is this
author's opinion that the public policy against racial discrimination is
more basic to the nation than the policy of resolving disputes through
private negotiations. One must remember that Vaca hardly makes this
kind of waiver an exercise of free choice.69 In creating the EEOC and
providing statutory muscle for the enforcement of civil rights, Congress
has given to the courts some of the means to combat racial discrimination. Public policy requires that the power to remedy unlawful
employment practices not be abdicated to another forum.
III.

THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION

The notion that the minority or individual position will not be
argued fully without the right of intervention for the grievant has
special significance in the case of discrimination charges. The Dewey
court recognized this factor when, refusing to bind the plaintiff to an
arbitration award, it noted that the plaintiff was not represented with
07 Lodge 743, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. United Aircraft Corp., 337 F2d 5
(2d Cir. 1964); cf. NLRB v. Strong Roofing & Insulating Co., 393 U.S. 357 (1969);
NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967) ; NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385
U.S. 421 (1967). See generally McCulloch, The Arbitration Issue in NLRB Decisions,
19 Axa. J. (n.s.) 134 (1964); Ordman, Arbitration and the NLRB, in NATIONAL
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(1967) ; Sovern, Section 301 and the Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76 HARV.
L. REv. 529 (1963). The Board will sometimes defer jurisdiction until completion
of arbitration. See Dubo Mfg. Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 431 (1963).
6s See article VII, section I of the 1967 Agreement between Ford Motor Co.
and UAW which states in part:
No employee or former employee shall have any right under this agreement
in any claim, proceeding, action or otherwise on the basis, or by reason, of
any claim that any Union Officer representative has acted or failed to act
relative to presentation, prosecution or settlement of any grievance or other
matter as to which the Union or any Union Officer or representative has
authority or discretion to act or not to act under the terms of this agreement.
Where there is no arbitration clause see Haynes v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co.,
362 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1966); International Brotherhood of Telephone Workers v.
New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 240 F. Supp. 426 (D. Mass. 1965).
9
1o
Text accompanying notes 13-15 supra.
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his own counsel at the hearing. 70 If the discrimination charge involves
the administration or negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement
(in which, of course, both the union and employer are involved), it is
often possible that the union's viewpoint and interests are different
from, or conflict directly with, those of the grievants.
The question posed under the rubric of third party intervention is
whether the individual or minority group has the right to be notified
of the arbitration hearing, and to participate in it with separate representation in the form of counsel or a civil rights organization in which
he has confidence. The New York Court of Appeals has held that the
individual has no third party right of intervention inasmuch as the
union is the exclusive bargaining agent with authority to bind all employees within the union.1 Notwithstanding that the Railway Labor
Act permits the individual to proceed in his own right through that
statute's adjudication machinery (which is controlled by the union and
the employer),72 the NLRB has taken the position that it will honor
an arbitration award even when the individual has no notice of the
hearing. Therefore he has no right to representation.73 The Board's
judgment is that even where the case involves an individual's discharge
pursuant to a union security clause, the discharged employee's absence
does not destroy the hearing's validity so long as the employer takes a
74
position at the hearing identical to that asserted by the individual.
In Clark v. Hei-Werner Corp.,75 a case involving a seniority
dispute, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has taken a slightly different
approach. In Clark the court held that a union was not performing its
"fiduciary" duty of fair representation in a case involving conflicting
employee claims. The court said that
where the interests of two groups of employees are diametrically opposed to each other and the union espouses the cause
of one in the arbitration, it follows as a matter of law that
there has been no fair representation of the group. This is
true even though, in choosing the cause of which group to
espouse, the union acts completely objectively and with the
best of motives. The old adage, that one cannot serve two
masters, is particularly applicable to such a situation.7 6
70291 F. Supp. at 789.

71 I re Soto, 7 N.Y.2d 397, 165 N.E.2d 855, 198 N.Y.S.2d 282 (1960).

However,

see the strong dissent of Judge VanVoorhis in Chupka v. Lorenz-Schneider Co., 12

N.Y.2d
1, 7; 186 N.E.2d 191, 193; 233 N.Y.S.2d 929, 932 (1962).
72

McElroy v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 392 F.2d 966 (7th Cir. 1968); Estes v.
Union Terminal Co., 89 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1937).
73 International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962), enforced Vtb nora.
Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir. 1964).
74
Id. at 928.
75 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W.2d 132 (1960).
76
Id. at 272, 99 N.W.2d at 137.
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Concerning the argument that the employees' positions were considered by the arbitrator because the employer took the position of the
plaintiffs at the hearing, the court said:
Employees not fairly represented by the union should never
be put in the position of having solely to depend upon the
their rights under the collective-baremployer championing
7
gaining contract.

7

In Humphrey v. Moore,"8 the Supreme Court considered an assertion that granting a right to employees to participate in the hearing was
a necessary element in the duty of fair representation. The Court
found that contrary to the dissident workers' allegations, they had in
fact participated fully.79 Nevertheless, one can conclude that the Court
impliedly accepted the position that the right to intervene is part and
parcel of the union's obligation to represent fairly, since the Court examined the issue factually rather than dismissing as a matter of law.
However, we must keep in mind that conflicting seniority claims of two
different groups of employees were involved, and for the reasons
enumerated in Clark, the Court may have been particularly sensitive to
the third party intervention argument in this context.
However, despite Clark and Humphrey, the case law shows no
uniform trend toward a policy favoring third party intervention. In
fact, any hope of adoption was recently set back by the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Acuff v. United Papermakers.° In Acuff an arbitrator rejected the grievance of certain discharged employees and reduced the
discharge of others to disciplinary layoff, following a wildcat strike.
The employees subsequently filed in the district court which had ordered
the arbitration a motion to intervene. The court ignored Humphrey
and relied heavily on Vaca for the proposition that third party intervention would interfere with the union's right to control the grievancearbitration process. After citing Vaca's rule that the union, and not
the individual, has the right to compel arbitration of a grievance, the
court stated:
It would be paradoxical in the extreme if the union, which is
authorized to decide whether a grievance is to be pursued to
the arbitration stage at all could not be authorized to assume
275, 99 N.W.2d at 138.
78 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
7Id. at

79 Id. at 349-351.
80 404 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987 (1969).
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full responsibility for a grievance it did pursue, without the
intervention of the individual union members immediately
concerned."'
Assuming the validity of the holding in Clark, the court stated that
Acuff was distinguishable inasmuch as "it [Clark] is a different case
if the interests of different groups of employees are in irreconcilable
conflict. Here the union could have and, as far as the record reveals,
did defend the rights of all the employees with equal zeal." '
However, Acuff is in error contrasting Clark. Although the
potential conflict of interest in exclusive union representation of wildcat
81-Id. at 171. It will be recalled that the Court's holding in Vaca is predicated
in part upon the exclusive bargaining representative status which is accorded unions
under the NLRA. See J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). However,
section 9(a) contains a proviso which indicates that
any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any
time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances
adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as
the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining
contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, that the bargaining
representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964). See generally
Hanslowe, Individual Rights in Collective Labor Relations, 45 CoMrxL L.Q. 25
(1959); Rosen, The Individual Worker in Grievance Arbitration: Still Another Look
at the Problem, 24 MARYLAND L. Rmv. 233 (1964) ; Summers, Individual Rights in
Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 362 (1962). The Second
Circuit has extended the proviso to protect a rival union in processing grievances
in the face of an exclusive bargaining representative's existence. See Douds v. Local
1250, Retail-Wholesale Union, 173 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1949). But see Dunan, Employee Participationin the Grievance Aspect of Collective Bargaining, 50 CoLuar. L.
REv. 731, 751-760 (1950); Broniman v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 353 F.2d 559
(6th Cir. 1965); Black-Clawson Co. v. IAM Lodge, 355, 313 F.?d 179 (?d Cir.
1962) ; Federal Tel. & Radio Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 649 (1953). See especially Republic
Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652, n.7 (1965); cf. Restaurant Management,
Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1069, n21 (1964); Dist. 65, Retail-Wholesale Union, 141
N.L.R.B. 991, 999 (1963) ; Mission Valley Inn, 140 N.L.R.B. 433 (1963) ; Fanelli Ford
Sales, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 1468 (1961); Weiss, The Unlazful Object in 8(b)(7)
Picketing, 13 LAnOR L.J. 787 (1962).
It will be argued that the intervention of a civil rights group in an arbitration
contrary to the Acuff rule in effect supports the existence of another "labor organization" and is therefore at odds with the exclusive representative concept. See NLRB
v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959); National Packing Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 446
(1964), enforcement denied and remanded, 352 F.2d 482 (10th Cir. 1965), original
order aff'd, 158 N.L.R.B. 1680 (1966), enforcement denied and rev'd, 377 F.2d 800
(10th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944). See
generally Gould, The Status of Unauthorized and "Wildcat" Strikes under the
National Labor Relations Act, 52 Comber. L.Q. 672 (1967). The question whether
the existence of civil rights groups in the arbitration or at some stage of grievance
processing or negotiations where they present some working demands is compatible
with the majority representative concept, has not been answered definitively by the
Board. NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 349 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1965), afirmed,
166 N.L.R.B. No. 35 (1967). However, probably no conflict between the exclusive
bargaining representative and the civil rights organization would exist unless the latter
attempted to oust the former from his representative capacity. Sometimes this line may
be an elusive one to draw. See Moss-American, Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. No. 30 (1969).
82Acuff v. United Papermakers, 404 F.2d 169, 171 n.3 (5th Cir. 1968).
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strikers is not quite as direct as it is in a seniority dispute, as was
involved in Clark, nevertheless there is not such a difference between
the two that they should be decided differently. In an unauthorized
stoppage a union has a strong interest in guarding its treasury against
strike liability. If the union can be shown to have instigated or aided
the walkout, it may be liable for damagesY.3 At the same time, the
union is obliged to argue for reinstatement or for scaling down of penalties on behalf of the strikers. A striker might testify that a union officer
or committeeman told him to "down tools"-in other words, that the
walkout was not something initiated by workers independent of their
union. Might not some unions wish to keep such a grievant away from
the hearing and without representation, even though the result would
be discharge or suspension for the offending worker? These kinds
of dilemmas for the union, as well as the fact that a perusal of the
hearing transcript (if one is kept) can rarely inform a court on the
enthusiasm with which the union presented the case, make the Fifth
Circuit's search of the record for union zeal irrelevant and futile.
Second, the court's conclusion that it would be "paradoxical" to
provide for third party intervention in light of Vaca is curious. If
anything, the control that Vaca affords the union in discharging its responsibilities would argue for a limited right such as intervention for
those who might be out of favor with the exclusive bargaining representative. Under Vaca, unions will have little difficulty in refusing to
take to arbitration those cases in which third party intervention might
cause them substantial discomfort. To say that because the union has
authority to interfere with the individual's right to compel arbitration,
third party intervention is to be denied once arbitration is underway,
defies common sense and sound logic.
When one considers the question of third party intervention in
the context of title VII racial discrimination grievances, it is important
to recall the Court's remarks in Lincoln 1fills about the judicial role
in section 301 (a) labor arbitration suits:
[T]he substantive law to apply in suits under § 301 (a) is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our
national labor laws. . . . The Labor Management Relations
Act expressly furnishes some substantive law. It points out
what the parties may or may not do in certain situations.
Other problems will lie in the penumbra of express statutory
mandate. Some will lack express statutory sanction but will
be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and
fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The
83 See United Constr. Workers v. Haislip Baking Co., 223 F.2d 872 (4th Cir.
1955) (dictum).
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range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the
nature of the problem.84
One must assume that title VII is one of the statutes to which the
Court is to pay heed in fashioning remedies that do not possess "express statutory sanction," but nevertheless lie in the "penumbra" of the
statute's mandate. In enacting title VII, Congress recognized that
black workers were under-represented at the bargaining table, excluded
unfairly and arbitrarily from leadership positions in unions (even when
their numbers were large, because generally whites will not vote for
blacks in union elections 85), and were dealt with unjustly at the
bargaining table by both unions and employers.8" Title VII was
passed to remedy, among other things, the unique problems of racial
minority groups in the United States, which majority representatives
in many organized enterprises failed to solve. Considering this policy,
courts should seize the opportunity presented by Lincoln Mills to order
either a form of trilateral arbitration (if a civil rights organization has
entered into an agreement over hiring with an employer), or third
party intervention where appropriate. Objection may be made that
the entry of a third party would unduly disturb the uniformity in
administering plant grievances-a principle emphasized in both Maddox
and Vaca-but the answer must be that "[t]he rationality of the exhaustion doctrine is dependent upon the fairness of the process to which
the individual is remanded." 87
In Hotel Employees Association,88 an arbitrator invalidated a civil
rights agreement without the presence at the arbitration proceeding of
the organization which negotiated it. It is certainly possible that notice
to the organization and the opportunity to participate in the hearing
would have exposed the arbitrator to the full clash of opposing viewpoints which should be an integral part of a hearing procedure. Perhaps
the judiciary should either vacate the award or refuse to compel arbi84

Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957) (emphasis
added).
85See generally Gould, Black Workers in White Unions, THE NATIT, September 8, 1969, at 203; Gould, The Negro Revolution and Trade Unionisn, in 114 CONG.
REc. E7226-28 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1968).
S6See generally Comment, Equal Protection, 82 HAv. L. REv. 1065 (1969);
Comment, The "Nez" Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82 HARv.
L. REv. 1294 (1969) ; Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). As Justice
Douglas said: "Today the black is protected by a host of civil rights laws. But the
forces of discrimination are still strong." Id. at 447 (concurring opinion).
87 Note, Federal Protection of Individual Rights wnder Labor Contracts, 73 YALE
L.J. 1215, 1228 (1964). Moreover, under title VII, the complainant is not bound
to a settlement negotiated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission unless
the complainant agrees to be bound. See EEOC General Counsel Opinion Letter,
July 20, 1966, in BNA FAIR Eml. PRAc. 401: 3009; Cox v. United States Gypsum
Co., 284 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. Ind. 1968).
88 47 Lab. Arb. 873 (1966).
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tration where such notice is not given in racial discrimination cases.8
As the courts have already acknowledged in the exhaustion cases, title
VII and racial discrimination stand on a special plateau."
However, the practical problems involved cannot be gainsaid. One
such problem would arise if a civil rights organization sought to intervene without any indication that Negro or other minority group workers
desired intervention. In such a situation, the demands of what is, in
effect, an interloper ought to be firmly denied. Only the minority group
workers' designee should be permitted to participate.
Another objection is that many groups or individuals might
desire to participate in the arbitration if a third party intervention or
similar rule were promulgated. Obviously, since a large number of
intervenors would pose practical problems of orderliness, courts and
arbitrators ought to require that a reasonably substantial number of
workers request the involvement before intervention in the arbitration
process is permitted.
Although third party intervention may appear at first glance to be
a radical proposal, in fact it should result in minimal disruption of the
arbitration process. In many grievances, particularly discharges, the
union-partially because of its omnipresent duty of fair representationwill process the grievance in a manner which will not make it necessary
for the worker to involve a third party. Or, those unions which do
not like the grievant or his case may invite participation to avoid a
lawsuit. Moreover, some arbitrators already insist upon hearing the
testimony and requiring the attendance of individual employees when
there is the slightest indication of divergence of viewpoints between
union and employee. Finally, the principle of exclusivity and majority
rule is well protected by Supreme Court decisions such as Vaca. Indeed the most telling argument against intervention is that unions
will eventually become too selective in taking cases to arbitration. But
to a large extent, Vaca already encourages this result. In any event, a
third party intervention requirement such as that advocated here would
seem to do little damage to the Vaca principle. While adoption of the
third party intervention proposal ought not to be used to weaken the
preceding arguments against the election of remedies doctrine or even
to support application of the Spielberg doctrine 9 to racial discrimination
grievances, both EEOC and the courts would properly accord greater
deference to the arbitral process and its decisions, if this proposal is
accepted along with other proposals offered below.
89 See Gould, Non-Governmental Remedies for Ensploymeat Discrimination,supra
note 6.
90 Cases cited note 21 supra.
91 Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955).
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IV.

PATCHING UP THE LEAKY SHIP

Various additional remedial devices could be used to improve the
lot of the minority group worker who is inadequately represented by
his union. As noted above, one of the problems in the arbitration of
racial grievances is that unions and employers themselves select third
party representatives. Where, as in Hotel Employers Association, the
arbitrator construes both the civil rights agreement and the collective
bargaining agreement, all parties ought to be involved in selection of
the arbitrator as well as in the proceeding itself. In the somewhat
analogous situation of two unions entangled in a jurisdictional dispute,
the Supreme Court rejected the argument that trilateral arbitration is a
requirement if only one of them is a party to the arbitration and contract involved. 2 However, the Court's holding in Lincoln Mills-that
remedies will be fashioned in light of the total body of national labor
law-makes possible a different result in the case of racial discrimination.
Even with the contractual base of a civil rights agreement, the
remedy for discrimination and violation of the union's duty of fair
representation should recognize the triangular nature of the racial
grievance. This is exactly what was done by the trial examiner in
PortDrum Co.,"93 who ordered that no arbitrator or counsel representing
the charging party's interests was to be appointed without the charging
party's prior written approval and consent. However, a unanimous
Board modified the order so that, as in Rubber Workers, 4 the union
would be obligated merely to take the grievance to arbitration. But
the effect was mitigated somewhat when the Board held, while setting
aside another portion of the trial examiner's order obligating the union
to make the charging party whole in the event that "resort to arbitration
or fully effective relief [was] . . . now . . . barred or precluded and

cannot be forthcoming," that it would retain jurisdiction so that the
hearing might be reopened subsequent to the arbitration."'
Second, if title VII is to be used by arbitrators where nondiscrimination or separability clauses present the opportunity, the arbitrators
must be advised by those who possess expertise in matters foreign to
their experience." Thus Congress should amend title VII to provide
02 See Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 265 (1964) ; id. at 274

(dissenting opinion).
93 CCH NLRB Dec. 1122, 272 (1968).
9 150 N.L.R.B. 312, eiyfd on this point, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966).
95 d.

96 One should recall that the arbitrator's expertise, albeit valuable and important,
nAmerica v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
is in other areas. See United Steelworkers of
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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for an advisory opinion on title VII issues raised in the hearing. These
opinions could be rendered by the EEOC pursuant to the request of the
arbitrators or the parties. Perhaps EEOC should be required to provide the parties with the advisory opinion even when not requested,
when a grievance alleging racial discrimination is brought to their
attention by a party. Another alternative (one that might be more
orderly) is to require the arbitrator to request the opinion.
Additionally, when EEOC enters into conciliation agreements,97
it could obtain the expertise and flexibility of arbitration by special arbitration clauses to deal with such issues as seniority disputes. The
Commission ought to begin to exercise substantial authority in the
selection of the arbitrator, and it might be beneficial for it to maintain
a list of neutrals whom it considers acceptable. A source for such
arbitrators might be the American Arbitration Association Center for
Dispute Settlement, which is involved in minority group disputes.
Finally, an arbitral remedy arguably consistent with the general
intent of the nondiscrimination and separability clause is that employed
in Phillips Petroleum CoY In that case the arbitrator, while rejecting
the contention that the company's refusal to appoint a woman to its
credit trainee program was discrimination by sex, nevertheless noted
that not one of the 118 trainees previously appointed was a woman. The
arbitrator's award stated that if the union had not already filed a
complaint, the company would request the Missouri Human Rights
Commission to make an evaluation of past and present policies of candidate selection for the trainee program.
This author believes that the Phillips approach is laudable and
proper, although it may not have been fully contemplated by the parties.
However, where there is no group of discriminatees already employed in
the particular establishment, as in the Phillips case itself, one wonders
whether such an award will in fact be effectuated. In PhillipsPetroleum
Co., investigation revealed that subsequently neither the union nor the
employer had contacted the Commission.'00 If the arbitrator were to
undertake this function himself, most likely the parties would feel, and
rightfully so, that he had exceeded his authority. Even unions and
employers that negotiate nondiscrimination clauses in good faith do not
wish to invite the EEOC and similar state agencies onto plant
97 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(5) (a) (1964).

98 50 Lab. Arb. 522 (1968).
s9 This ought not to restrain the arbitrator from acting. Cox, Rights Under
a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. Rxv. 601 (1956).
100 Telephone conversation between research assistant James VeuCasovic and
Miss Sandra Neece, Director of Investigation for Missouri Human Rights Commission, May 29, 1969.
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premises-hardly anyone appoints an arbitrator to perform this task
for them. Rather, their thought is to resolve discrimination problems
without such complications.
V.

CONCLUSION

The analysis and proposals outlined in this Article would modify
in large part the voluntary and private nature of labor arbitration. They
run against the grain of much of the conventional wisdom contained
in the national labor policy devised since the War Labor Board gave
arbitration its real beginning in the United States some twenty-five
years ago.
Most likely one must also accept the proposition that the adoption
of approaches taken in this Article may result in a revision of our industrial relations system beyond racial disputes. Other minorities and
individuals in nonracial cases will insist upon the application of the same
standards in all arbitrations where, for one reason or another, the union
is not trusted by those whom it represents. Perhaps, though, the extension of title VII advocated here, in an age in which union leadership
seems so remote to the rank and file worker, is a step in the right
direction in industrial relations generally.
There is no reason why the rules of third party intervention herein
advocated cannot be fashioned in both racial and nonracial cases in a
manner which avoids excessive disruption.1"' Here, as in other situations, the Negro revolution may reform our institutions to the benefit
of both races. But the theme of this Article is that America is obligated
to devise special procedures for racial problems-particularly in the
case of black workers. It is not proposed that the majority rule principle be scrapped in favor of another doctrine. What is suggested
amounts to an accommodation of that principle with procedures more
effectively designed to achieve the objectives of civil rights statutes.
The left hand of national labor law cannot perform in ignorance of what
the right hand is doing.
The most troubling aspect about the positions taken in this Article
is whether the leaky ship is worth patching. One might well argue that
it is better to build a new ship constructed in the form of government
labor courts more responsive to public law. That solution is a more
ambitious undertaking which can be left to others. For the moment,
we must modify those procedures already available. Equity for the
black worker cannot be permitted to await fundamental labor law
reforms in the distant future.
10 1 See Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A2d 825 (1963).
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It is too late for those involved in arbitration, or for the trade union
movement generally, to complain about limited regulation by public law
concepts. If ever there was an area in which the value of consensual
arrangements is clearly outweighed, it is found in the attempt to eliminate the systematic discrimination which government, unions, and
employers historically have practiced against the Negro worker.

